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of Louisiana, there is reason to believe that the Reymond decision
has opened the gate for a course of meaningful development along
these lines in this state.
TORTS
William E. Crawford*
SELECTED Topics
Traffic Cases
In Cartwright v. Firemen's Insurance Co.' the Supreme
Court of Louisiana held emphatically that under Louisiana law
an automobile owner may not be held liable under the theory
of strict liability for damages resulting from a latent defect
in the brakes of his vehicle. The court pointed out that strict
liability, or liability without fault, may not be invoked as a
theory of recovery unless provided for by the legislation of
the state. The court further specifically stated that the policy
considerations inherent in the problem were properly for the
legislature rather than for the court.
In Fairbanks v. Travelers Insurance Co.,2 involving opera-
tion of vehicles on the highways, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeal applied and interpreted the so-called "slow speed statute '8
to find for the plaintiffs. It is the first appellate case reported
under this statute. The crucial language of the statute forbids
the operation of a motor vehicle upon the highways "at such
a slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable move-
ment of traffic."4 The court found that it was for the trier of
fact to determine whether the speed in a given case was slow
enough to constitute a violation of the statute. As the court
pointed out, excessive speed under certain conditions has long
been found to be negligence. It is hardly debatable that an
excessively slow speed on modern highways can be dangerous
and therefore should be classifiable as negligence.
A statement by that court in dictum may give rise to trouble
in future cases of this nature. The court said:
"Thus, the slightest degree of inattentiveness by the driver
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 254 La. 330, 223 So.2d 822 (1969).
2. 232 So.2d 323 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970), rehearing denied, Mar. 3, 1970.
3. LA. R.S. 32:64B (1950).
4. Id.
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of the fast moving car, coupled with the unexpected presence
of the unreasonably slow moving vehicle combines to cause
a collision. Therefore, the negligence of each driver is a
cause in fact of the accident. ' 5
Defendants in the future will pitch at least part of their
case on finding "the slightest degree of inattentiveness by the
driver of the fast moving car," in order to pin contributory
negligence upon the plaintiff. Defendants could even argue that
contributory negligence obtained as a matter of law, in view
of the above-quoted dictum, even though a driver guilty of "the
slightest degree of inattentiveness" would rarely have violated
the standard of care for keeping a proper lookout. The dictum
states what may be construed as a different and very much
higher standard of care for a following driver in keeping a
lookout than now applies.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Ardoin v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp.6 discussed, without naming it, the problem of
antecedent negligence as precluding the invocation of the last
clear chance theory by the plaintiff on the grounds that the
defendant had no actual opportunity to avoid the accident after
he discovered the peril of the plaintiff. The defendant, driving
a giant tractor-trailer, approached an intersection protected by
a flashing yellow light toward him and a flashing red light
toward the plaintiff. The court found the defendant negligent
for failing to reduce speed upon seeing the flashing yellow light
and found the plaintiff negligent for attempting to cross with
the approaching truck in his vision. The opinion cites expert
testimony to establish that defendant's truck was 257 feet from
the intersection at the time plaintiff started to cross. Stopping
time was established as being 393 feet, including reaction
time. It could easily be calculated, with the time-distance testi-
mony of the experts, that failure of the defendant-truck driver
to reduce his speed upon seeing the flashing yellow light effec-
tively deprived him of what would have been a very real
opportunity :to avoid the accident.
Whether to recognize antecedent negligence depriving the
defendant of the opportunity to avoid the accident as operating
in favor of defendant or plaintiff is a question usually resolved
in favor of the defendant. The dilemma clearly presents itself
5. 232 So.2d 323, 327-28 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
6. 232 So.2d 136 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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when it is recognized that a speed demon operating at 90 miles
an hour may win his case while a motorist who is traveling
at a reasonable rate of speed, but who simply fails to act promptly
to avoid the accident, may lose. Under the antecedent negligence
reasoning currently obtaining in most jurisdictions, the speed
demon goes free because he never had the opportunity to stop.
It seems that Judge Hood in the Thayer case 7 found a way to
eliminate this injustice by finding that the negligence of the
plaintiff in those situations simply is not a legal cause of the
accident. It is not a last clear chance situation at all. The ques-
tion is whether, in view of the defendant's antecedent negligence,
the plaintiff's negligence is a contributing cause at all, and if
it is contributing, whether it is sufficient to qualify as a sub-
stantial factor, as a legal cause, or as a proximate cause (in
absence of which, the court with complete rationality could
find for the plaintiff). The case at hand does not involve conduct
as reprehensible as the foregoing illustration of the speed demon,
however, and the result reached by the court seems to be a
just one.,
Premises Liability
In Cothern v. LaRocca the supreme court reversed an appel-
late decision and found no duty on the part of a restaurant
operator to warn of or repair a dangerous condition just beyond
the boundary of his parking lot. The plaintiff, coming to the
restaurant as a patron, stepped from her car onto the adjoining
premises and injured her leg when she alighted into a recess
in the ground for a water valve. The majority opinion cited
articles 2315 and 2316 of the Civil Code to determine the duty
of care owed by an owner or occupier of a premises to those who
come upon the premises. The court acknowledged the prominent
presence in our jurisprudence of the common law classifications
of trespasser, licensee, and invitee and went on to find that,
because the hole was off the restaurant premises and because
the restaurant operator had no knowledge of the hole and
further did not have knowledge that patrons might park in this
spot, he therefore could not be held liable.
Is it possible that there was a duty from the restaurant
operator to the plaintiff not grounded in the traditional
7. Thayer v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 229 So.2d 767 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969), rehearing denied, Aug. 26, 1969.
8. 255 La. 673, 232 So.2d 473 (1970), rehearing denied, Mar. 30, 1970.
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trespasser-licensee-invitee status? Is it plausible to say that the
restaurant operator was negligent toward the plaintiff in failing
to delimit clearly the parking area for which he assumed respon-
sibility, and thereby distinguish that area from the property of
the adjoining motel for which the restaurant operator undertook
no responsibility? (It should be noted that common law cases
are cited in the opinion giving off-premises responsibility where
adjoining parking lots were indistinguishable.) Must fault under
article 2315 be restricted to the considerations inexorably attach-
ed to the common law licensee-invitee-trespasser categories?
It seems unduly restrictive of article 2315 to say that the plain-
tiff's action must fail unless she fits her case within the categories
and fulfills the particular requirements attaching thereto. In
short, there seems to be room here for a discussion of duty and
negligence completely apart from the premises-liability cate-
gories.
Proximate Cause
The case of Craig v. Burch9 involved injuries to the plaintiff
resulting from the failure of a recapped automobile tire. It is
interesting that the court inquired most thoughtfully into the
problem of proximate cause between the failure of the tire and
the resulting injuries. The court pointed out that the proximate
cause problem is actually a consideration of the duty owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff with respect to the protection
or not of the plaintiff's interests. Yet, the basis for the defendant's
liability was held by the court to be his negligent breach of
warranty under article 2476 of the Civil Code. The proper
analysis would therefore have been to consider the statutory
law, article 2476, and determine whether the intent of that
legislation was to protect this plaintiff against this harm. The
court apparently did not base its recovery upon article 2315.
Proximate cause analysis is peculiarly tort and is perhaps
unnecessary where the plaintiff relies upon a duty owed under
the specific provisions of an article of the Civil Code or under
the provisions of other legislation.
Duty to Supervise Young Hunters
In Laney v. Stubbs 0 the Supreme Court of Louisiana found
the defendant not liable for the damages suffered by the
9. 228 So.2d 723 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1969), reheaing denied, Dec. 22, 1969.
10. 255 La. 84, 229 So.2d 708 (1969).
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plaintiffs as a result of the death of their son, age 14, caused
by the bullet wound from a .22 caliber rifle in the hands of
one of a group of teenage boys on a hunting venture originating
from defendant's residence. Of the four boys hunting, three
had shotguns and only one had a rifle. The decedent incurred
his tragic wound when the rifle was fired on the level in the
field where decedent was hunting. The sole issue considered by
the supreme court was whether defendant, father of the young
hunter who had given the rifle to his companion to use, had
breached a duty toward the decedent. The court found that
defendant had no duty of supervision, because he "had no
knowledge of inexperience or ineptness on the part of Mac-
murdo [the boy who fired the rifle], nor did he know which
gun he was using. After admonishing the hunters to be careful,
he returned home. Under the circumstances, he had no duty
to supervise the bird hunt."'"
Expert Testimony-Cause-in-Fact
An interesting cause-in-fact problem was discussed in
Helminger v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co. 12 Plaintiff was a tile
contractor who, after using defendant's product on a job, suffered
burns and irritation of a very serious nature to his hands and
feet. The trial court found for the defendant. The appellate court
reversed, finding that while the chemical experts could testify
as to the nature of the ingredient suspected of causing the harm,
it was for a medical expert to speak on whether the ingredient
was actually capable of inflicting the injuries.
After the testimony of a medical expert was reviewed and
accepted by the appellate court, it turned to the question of
whether the ingredient could be a cause-in-fact of the injuries.
The court pointed out that the medical diagnosis indicated that
the ingredient's causation was likely; and that:
"Considering all of the circumstances, and in the absence
of any other plausible explanation, we find that the most
probable cause of Helminger's chemical hand and foot burns
was his repeated exposure to MEKP residue in the brush-
cleaning operations. This sufficiently proves that the MEKP
exposure was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries,
for proof is sufficient to constitute a preponderance of the
11. Id. at 89, 229 So.2d at 710.
12. 230 So.2d 623 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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evidence when as a whole it shows that the event or causa-
tion sought to be proved is more probable than not."1 8
Apparently the court correctly relied on the expert medical
testimony that causation was likely as the major proof of
causation. It is interesting to note the fine line separating the
areas of competence of the experts. In this case the chemical
experts could testify as to the qualities of the ingredient, but
were not competent to testify as to the ingredient's effect upon
human skin, a point at which a medical expert became the
paramount authority.
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
"Earnings" and "Fruits"
Wurst v. Pruyn decided that the wife's earnings were not
"fruits of labor" within the meaning of article 2386 of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code and therefore that the wife's filing of a declara-
tion reserving to herself the administration of her paraphernalia
and all rights to its fruits, including those "from the result of
labor," had no effect on whether her earnings were separate or
community income. In Smith v. Smith,2 decided in 1960, the
Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit had decided the same
issue in contrary fashion, but the Smith decision clearly was in
error. Article 2386 refers to "fruits of the paraphernal property
of the wife" only, but lists all three kinds of fruits, those "nat-
ural," "civil," and "from the result of labor," which latter phrase
is substantially the definition of "cultivated fruits" under article
545 of the Civil Code.
There are instances, however, in which it becomes more dif-
ficult to decide whether income consists of "earnings," "fruits,"
or capital gains. Perhaps the classic instance is that of Hellberg
v. Hyland, decided in 1929,3 in which the supreme court treated
as earnings the capital gains made by the wife through the ma-
nipulation of her paraphernal assets. Paxton v. Bramlette4 may
become equally celebrated. A wife placed paraphernal immov-
13. Id. at 628.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 233 So.2d 255 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
2. 117 So.2d 670 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
3. 168 La. 493, 122 So. 593 (1929).
4. 228 So.2d 161 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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